B, C and D Companies set off into the hills while A Company protected the headquarters and the fire base of 103 Field Battery. At 11.45 on the morning of February 19th B Company sighted two Viet Cong at short range, half-way up the eastern side of the northern hill. The company deployed as the Viet Cong hurled a grenade at the forward members of four platoon and opened fire with small arms. Four Platoon under Lieutenant Carruthers returned the fire and swept forward. The Viet Cong withdrew, probably to the south. Four Platoon heard two more Viet Cong shouting to their left and another engaged the platoon with fire from the right so probably the platoon had contacted a squad of enemy. Carruthers had found that the Viet Cong had been using a small camp on the hillside containing three two-man weapon pits protected by overhead cover, a kitchen and a meeting place. Several documents were found in the camp. After a thorough search the camp was blown up.
In the meantime I had been sent aloft in the supporting Sioux helicopter to attempt to spot the fleeing Viet Cong and direct B Company onto them. Unfortunately the Viet Cong had fled into a particularly thick part of the jungle and I was unable to see anything under the foliage.
D Company met with considerable success in discovering enemy installations. They were searching the southernmost of three sectors which covered the northern half of the hills, and so they were closest in the first phase of the operation to the concentration of Viet Cong camps. Their first find was a sugar bag full of documents and a platoon defensive position, some two months old. The documents were chiefly propaganda to be distributed among the local villages.
After finding some tracks of Viet Cong, D Company followed them to a company-size defensive position which had been dug for a long time but which had been used by small groups recently. They proceeded to demolish the base with explosives. Shortly after 3p.m., the Reconnaissance Platoon, which was searching with D Company contacted four Viet Cong.
The Reconnaissance Platoon was a platoon that had been specially formed to replace the Anti-Tank Platoon. Colonel Warr began this experiment in November after our operational experience indicated that we had a need for a special team which could carry out reconnaissance to a distance of a few miles ahead of the battalion. The platoon was composed of selected volunteers and was commanded by Second Lieutenant Deak (Baron von Berg). It had been trained in a special course which we had run in Vung Tau in November and December. The platoon was organized to operate as a number of small teams each equipped with a radio. Space precludes description of the large number of individual reconnaissance's and ambushes which the platoon undertook. Suffice to say that the platoon was kept extremely busy, being lucky to have one night a month in base at Nui Dat The platoon was very successful in its operations, killing many Viet Cong in swift encounters in the jungle and producing a great deal of intelligence information to assist my work.
The Viet Cong contacted by the Reconnaissance Platoon included a woman who was armed with a Garrand M1 rifle. After a quick fire fight the Viet Cong fled to the south-east. Deak (Baron von Berg) called in artillery fire onto their withdrawal route. When the platoon cleared through the area where the Viet Cong had been located they found the body of the woman and her weapon.
During the night A Company reported lights moving on the northern face of the southernmost of the hills, Hon Vung. These lights were close to a reported enemy base and artillery were fired at them. They were quickly extinguished. D Company continued to have success on the following day, finding the following installations;
a squad size camp
a company base with 46 pits, all provided with overhead cover and containing some .30 calibre ammunition,
a company base with 50 pits and a well which appeared to be three months old,
22 graves, one to two months old
3 rice bins each capable of holding five tons of rice, two underground and one above ground, all empty.
The camps and rice bins were all destroyed. Near one of the camps and unexploded five-hundred-pound bomb was found. This was given a wide berth as we did not have the necessary skill of dealing safely with such a complicated destructive mechanism.
One the following day, February 21st, D Company found another company-sized camp, equipped with crawl trenches between the main weapon pits and guarded by Panji pits which had sharp spikes in the bottom to trap an unwary attacker. Air and artillery bombardment had destroyed the camp. Three more camps, all destroyed by bombardment, were discovered nearby. One of the camps was equipped with many large bunkers and appeared to have been a headquarters. It may have been the headquarters of the Long Dat District Committee for some time. Another of the camps was capable of holding two companies. The most significant find by D Company however was a series of foot tracks, made by a group of approximately one hundred men within the previous week. The tracks were undeniably Viet Cong for they had been made by the familiar Ho Chi Minh sandals. The tracks headed to the south-east and could have been made by the Viet Cong who attacked Phuoc Hai or by a group who were fleeing from us.
B and C Companies had completed their first search areas buy the morning of February 21st and the operation moved into its second phase. The phase was to cover a search of the southern half of the hills. D Company were to move to an area immediately to the south of their first area, C company were to relieve A Company of headquarters defence and the latter were to search the central southern area, immediately south of D Company, and B Company were to move to the southernmost sector. Battalion Headquarters and the guns were to move forward to a new position, a little over a mile to the south-east.
C Company moved directly to the new headquarters area in mid morning of February 21st, and began to secure it for occupation. Shortly after their arrival several shots came from some nearby scrub It appeared that some Viet Cong were firing at the Sioux helicopter which was overhead. The Viet Cong fled at the approach of our troops leaving five empty .30 calibre cases in their firing position. After midday a convoy of the guns, B Company, Battalion Headquarters and A Company moved in APC's from the old headquarters to the new.
Jack Carruthers looked cheerily defiant of the world, his huge, bushy red moustache none the worst for the dust which covered him and his platoon as they rode on the outside of the leading APC's. He made a few light-hearted remarks to me about the steepness of the hill which B Company would shortly clambering up in the broiling afternoon heat as I went by his halted vehicle at the new headquarters site. After depositing my kit I had a chance for a few words with Bruce McQualter. I had just received in the mail a photograph of him which had been taken during our leave in Hong Kong in December. It was a bad time to give it to him as few things stayed clean on forward operations. He was about to give it back to me when he quipped I would be sure to lose it amongst all my papers and maps. He ran off exuberantly and climbed into his company headquarters vehicle. At 1.41p.m. he called up on the radio to announce that his company was on its way with APC's to the southern sector.
At 2.07p.m. we were alarmed by a loud explosion in the direction from which B Company had gone. The commander of the APC's had announced over the command net that his leading vehicle had been blown over onto its side by a mine. The convoy had been working its way through the jungle, parallel to a track running to the south-east, taking care to keep off the track because of the danger of mines. After crossing the creek the leading vehicle came to a long clearing running across its path and linking with the track whose direction the convoy was following. The growth on the far side of the clearing was extremely dense and so the first APC swung right to move along the clearing to the track. intending to cross the track at that point and move through the jungle on the far side. The vehicle travelled slowly and silently in low gear up the junction with the track, slowing down to a halt before crossing the track so that the commander could see if the track was clear.
Just as the forward part of the APC reached the intersection a tremendous explosion went off, blowing the twelve-ton vehicle into the air and hurling it some ten feet away onto its side. A circular hole two feet across was blown right through the forward part of the hull. The blast wave inside the vehicle blew the rear door off. which landed on one of the men who had been hurled from the top of the vehicle, killing him. Several of those inside the vehicle were blown out the back door by the blast, it was very fortunate for them that the door had been blown off first. Most of the men escaped with bruises and shock. Another man who had been on the top of the APC, where it was often safer to ride when mines might be encountered, was thrown to the ground in the same place where the vehicle landed crushing him.
The APC's immediately swung into counter ambush procedure with alternate vehicles slewing to left and right, giving all-round observations and fields of fire for the .50 calibre machine guns. Four Platoon had been riding on the leading vehicles and most of the leading section of the platoon had been either killed or injured by the blast. The cause of the detonation of the mine was never identified. The only evidence remaining was a crater at the junction of the track and the clearing six feet across and four feet deep, and a home made contact switch designed to be set off by pressure. The switch was a simple split bamboo cane with a wedge inserted near the start of the split and the two split ends bounded in copper to each of which were attached copper wires with turquoise insulation. The wedge and the natural resilience of the bamboo kept the two contacts apart unless a pressure of a few pounds were applied to the copper bound ends. Such a device was ideal to bury a few inches beneath the surface of the track and in conjunction with an electric detonator could set off an explosion of any size.
It was evident that the mine had been set off when the APC was directly over the charge. This could have been done by a pressure switch on the mine itself or by a man hiding in the undergrowth at the side of the track holding the pressure switch in his hand. However, careful examination of the surrounding jungle revealed no trace of Viet Cong occupation and no hide of any type. Nor was there any movement seen after the detonation of the mine. hence it was unlikely that the mine was command detonated by human agency. On the other hand, had the switch which was found been part of the mine itself it is inconceivable that so flimsy a device could have survived the blast. Either it had been an alternate trigger on the main track or it had been left lying in the bushes by the Viet Cong who had set off the mine.
The force of the blast of the mine suggested that it was far larger than any conventional anti-tank mine. Probably it was an unexploded five-hundred-pound bomb such as the one discovered by D Company. Occasionally these bombs failed to detonate on landing and the Viet Cong were presented with a weapon of enormous destructive power which they kept for use against armoured vehicles. The absence of any fresh tracks in the area of the explosion suggested that this mine had been placed in position some months previously.
B Company had been travelling on the APC's in the order Four Platoon, Company Headquarters, Five Platoon and Six Platoon. As soon as the APC's had gone into their counter ambush procedure Major McQualter dismounted from his vehicle and quickly sized up the situation. The most vital need was to get medical attention to those injured by the explosion. Up to this point, three of B Company and two APC crew men had been killed and nine others had been injured. Major McQualter summoned the company medic, Corporal Nichols, and the stretcher bearers from Five and Six Platoons.
Most of the members of Four Platoon had dismounted and taken up fire positions on the ground alongside and in front of the vehicles which faced outwards either edge of the clearing. Lieutenant Carruthers and Sergeant Wass were standing at the rear of the second APC, commencing to organize assistance to the injured and estimation of the damage done. Major McQualter came forward with the two stretcher bearers from Five and Six Platoons, Corporal Nichols, Corporal Bouse, and company stretcher bearer NCO and his two radio operators, Private Tape and private Anthony. He was followed by the acting CSM, Staff Sergeant Benson, who besides being Drum Major of the Battalion, was also a highly trained medic.
Just as the group approached the rear of the second APC where Carruthers and Wass were standing a second explosion from the midst of the approaching group rent the air. Someone had trodden on the pressure switch of a deadly "Jumping Jack' mine. The mine had bounded four feet into the air before exploding with a colossal force and hurling large chunks of shrapnel into those nearby. This second explosion occurred at 2.11p.m. So much had happened in the space of four minutes. All of those in the vicinity of the mine were struck by flying steel. The most seriously injured were Major McQualter and Lieutenant Carruthers. Sergeant Wass was also extremely badly wounded. Staff Benson received extensive wounds and all the medics, stretcher bearers and radio operators were both wounded and dazed by the blast.
The survivors of the blast had to then cope with the psychological problem of not knowing where to put their feet for fear of setting off more deadly explosions. It was obvious that the company was in a Viet Cong mine ambush. The convoy was halted by a large anti-vehicle charge in an area seeded with anti-personnel mines which would be set off by the troops dismounting from their vehicles to avoid any anti-tank rockets which might be fired at the stationary targets.
Just at this moment, Captain Tony White arrived at the scene. As soon as Colonel Warr had heard the blast he summoned the Sioux helicopter which had been at Battalion Headquarters and sent Tony off to B Company. In the meantime, the commander of the APC's had called Battalion Headquarters to announce the first group of casualties and request a Dust Off aircraft. Peter Isaacs notified Task Force Headquarters and within minutes an Iroquois was overhead, awaiting the preparation of a landing zone at the point of the explosions. Tony had to cope with the atmosphere of deep shock and fear when he arrived. Some men had responded to the crisis extremely well. Corporals Nichols and Bouse, although wounded themselves began treating the other casualties which had grown to thirty one in number. Other men had to be handled firmly to shake them out of a dazed condition so they could begin to get on top of the situation by commencing to search for mines and to clear a landing zone for the Iroquois Dust Off helicopters.
Another severe problem for Tony was to ascertain who was to be treated first out of the large group of casualties, several of whom were in danger of imminent death. Fortunately the 36th U.S. Evacuation Hospital at Vung Tau was only five minutes away by Iroquois and the worst cases were on the operating tables within twenty minutes of being wounded. Major McQualter was still just conscious when Tony arrived and urged him to treat the Four Platoon casualties first. Shortly afterwards Bruce lost consciousness. Several aircraft were needed to carry out all the casualties and the last were evacuated at 3.30p.m. All this time Captain White had been moving about amongst the casualties, a fearful scene of carnage, without regard for his own personal safety which was menaced by several other mines which were being discovered.
Colonel Warr ordered B Company, now commanded by Lieutenant Pott of Six Platoon, and the APC's to remain stationary until a relieving force of A Company and a team of sappers had arrived. Major Carroll was ordered to move through B Company with the greatest caution and to assume command of the group for the night. After a tense three-hour approach, during which several clusters of 'Jumping Jack' mines were discovered, A Company reached the remnant of B Company and Major Carroll organized a combined harbour for the night.
While this drama had been taking place the Task Force Headquarters had been busy in reaction to another threat. The headquarters of 275 Regiment had moved southwards from its earlier location and was now provocatively close to the boundary of the Task Force area of responsibility, ten miles to the east of Nui Dat. The movements of the Commander of the Fifth Viet Cong Division also indicated an interest in operations close to Nui Dat, while 274 Regiment, which had been dormant since December, was in a position to participate in a divisional assault on the Task Force base. Consequently, with reluctance, Brigadier Graham had decided on the afternoon of February 21st that we would have to return to Nui Dat. Captain Goodwin of the of the Task Force operations staff flew out to the new Battalion Headquarters and discussed the move with Colonel Warr. After some calculating, the time for the air lift back to Nui Dat was fixed at 10 a.m. B and D Companies were to go by helicopter while the remainder of the battalion were to move by road in trucks and APC's. Everyone regretted the need for this decision after we had taken such a heavy blow. It was important for the morale of the battalion to carry the operation through to a successful conclusion rather then to be pulled out just when we had taken a beating. However, the security of Nui Dat was the sine qua non of our operations in Vietnam and so it had to take first place.
Just before 9 p.m., Major Carroll reported some lights up on the northern slope of Hon Vung which overlooked the area in which the explosions had taken place. Artillery fire was directed onto the hillside by Captain Tony Wales, the New Zealand forward observations officer with A Company. It seemed as if some men were in a cave whose entrance passage had a bend several feet from the cave mouth. Around this bend was the main chamber which was lit. A blanket over the entrance to this chamber was blowing aside from time to time, and the red glare of a fire inside the cave was being reflected onto the wall of the entrance passage. It was this flickering red glow which A company had seen and it took some little while to work out what was causing it. The artillery fire was very accurate and Major Burge, who had taken over command of 103 Battery in November, laid on an extensive fire plan. The success of the artillery was illustrated to all of us at the foot of the hills when the hillside was illuminated by a secondary explosion set off by on of the shells. It must have struck a trip flare indicating that the target was a well defended Viet Cong base. Further shelling produced a chain of small secondary explosions as caches of small arms ammunition were detonated. The weight of the artillery fire was increased by the eight inch guns from Nui Dat, which shifted their fire up and down the slope with fine precision. The target looked such a promising one that an air strike was arranged for the following morning.
During the first part of the morning of February 22nd, the companies had begun to concentrate at the Battalion Headquarters location. A Company found an anti-tank mine on the track which they followed out of the danger area. The mine was successfully defused. The APC which had been blown up by the first mine was a complete write off, so its frame was stripped of anything useful to us or to the Viet Cong and it was then burnt with petrol. At 9.35 a.m. the strike onto the Hon Vung caves began. A mixture of high explosive and napalm descended onto the rocks, the napalm trickling down into the caves and burning where the blast of high explosives could not reach.
The battalion reassembled at Nui Dat at 1 p.m. and prepared special precautions for an attack on the base. We then began a series of Company patrols through the area surrounding Nui Dat which lasted until the next major operation, preventing us from going back into the Long Hai hills to settle the score with whoever remained in the southern part. The only troops to return to the hills were a patrol of the Provincial Reconnaissance Unit, a specialised team of Vietnamese, trained in long range reconnaissance, advanced field craft and sabotage. This patrol was commanded by Captain John Leggett, an Australian who was attached to the Provincial Headquarters. It was a courageous feat for twenty lightly armed men to enter this Viet Cong base and their audacity was repaid by the result. They found two Viet Cong guarding the caves on the steep hillside one of whom they killed while the other fled. In the caves they found three Claymore mines, two other anti-personnel mines, ten Chinese communist grenades, one thousand rounds of Soviet 7.92 mm. rifle ammunition, and one 60mm mortar bomb. The area had been devastated by the air strike and the artillery. The .50 calibre machine guns of the APC's which had fired directly into the mouth of the illuminated cave on the night of February 21st had been particularly accurate.
However, Operation Renmark continued in the minds of many for two of the casualties, Major McQualter and Lieutenant Carruthers, were fighting for their lives in hospital. Despite severe head and body injuries, each man held onto life with great tenacity. Lieutenant Carruthers died on February 24th and Major McQualter died at 5 a.m. on March 5th. After the loses at An Nhut these further casualties were a great blow. Altogether we had lost seven killed and twenty-two wounded in the Long Hai hills. The personal impact of the loss of these close friends and comrades made itself deeply felt. The losses also went a long way towards obliterating the notion of immortality which tends to influence the thinking of optimistic soldiers after some time in battle.
Captain Robert O'Neill
Intelligence Officer
5 RAR