The young returnee was rather nervous at the centre of so much curiosity and sprang to his feet when we entered the room. We shook his hand and told him that he was very welcome. Father Francis had already seen that he had been given some food and a cigarette, so Colonel Warr then explained to him what would happen to him and asked for his story. He had been born in 1946 in a province from which many of the members of 274 Regiment had come. He had joined the Viet Cong at the age of sixteen because he had believed that the Viet Cong held the best answer to Vietnam's future and because he thought that the Viet Cong would overthrow the Government in a short time. His education had extended only to reading and writing and he had no religious beliefs. Since 1964 he had become disillusioned with Viet Cong methods and with their failure to keep their promises of victory. he disliked the way in which he had to go about the countryside taking food and money from peasants who were as poor as his family and he had grown tired of the continual surveillance to which he was subjected in his life with 274 Regiment. He had made up his mind to surrender several months before hand and it had taken him all this time to find the right opportunity for putting into practice what cannot be related at this time for the sake of others who may be still trying to use the same method. He had been running since early that morning and had obviously been through a terrific strain until he had come out at the edge of Binh Gia paddy fields, close to where the old man had escorted him in had been working. The old man had received a fright when this wild looking young man had dashed out of the jungle at him with a rifle. The returnee must have also been under great stress in wondering how he would be treated once he had given himself up. He had heard from others that the Chieu Hoi system was a genuine amnesty but he had no certain knowledge that this was the case. He need not have worried however, for he was paid 1,500 Piastre ($15 Aust.) for his weapon and that evening he was seated in an armchair watching television in Ba Ria and reflecting on the events of the day.
One piece of information he had given us that one of the battalions of 274 Regiment was moving westwards towards Route 2 around the northern side of Ngai Giao so we decided to keep a close eye on this part of the country. Colonel Warr visited Major Prescott at Duc Thanh on the following morning, Thursday, September 29th and learned that some of the Regional Forces company who lived in the compound had observed two companies of main force Viet Cong seated in open country on either side of Route 2 two miles north of Duc Thanh eating a meal. This news was particularly interesting in the light of the information given to us by the returnee on the previous day. The area in which this force of Viet Cong were located was on the extreme northern edge of the Task Force's area of responsibility. It had not been searched before and the whole vicinity of Ngai Giao was known to support much Viet Cong activity. They had established several roadblocks to the north of the Duc Thanh compound, they had completely dug away the road in places for lengths of five yards and they had sown the road with mines in several parts. Traffic between Ba Ria and Xuan Loc was taxed at Ngai Giao, and the village was used as a supply collection point by the main Viet Cong force.
Thus time was ripe for a thrust into this area and Colonel Warr obtained permission from Brigadier Jackson to follow up the report received through Major Prescott. Planning occupied Friday September 30th and the operation, named Crowsnest, was timed to begin on October 1st.
The battalion had been given a troop of APC's in support for the operation by Brigadier Jackson. The area to be searched contained much open field, dotted with clusters of houses and small patches of timber. This fairly clear country extended back from Route 2 to a distance of nearly one mile on either side of the road, so there was much scope for a combined armour and infantry sweep which would cover large stretches of country in which there might have been tunnels or other installations. The clear land was bounded by dense jungle to the east and west by a rubber plantation to the south. The main group of houses at Ngai Giao lay on the western side of the road at the northern edge of this rubber plantation. Dotted about the area within a mile of Ngai Giao were the small hamlets of Mo Tin, Huong Sa, Hean and Nang Son. These together with Ngai Giao were the obvious points for detailed searches by infantry on foot to uncover any caches, tunnels or bunkers which the Viet Cong had dug. The several clumps of timber also called for infantry searches, but the remainder where suitable for APC's with infantry on board to handle any pockets of guerillas who could not be reached by the APC's.
The detailed search to be carried out required at least one company and because we were operating so far from Nui Dat, another company had to be provided to protect 103 Field Battery in a forward gun position at Duc Thanh. The other two rifle companies A and B, were ordered to remain at thirty minutes notice to move at Nui Dat. D. Company which had relieved C. Company was to guard the guns. A skeleton battalion headquarters team consisting of Colonel Warr, Max Carroll and myself, our radio operators and an administrative element commanded by Captain Ron Boxall was to move forward and control the operation from Duc Thanh compound.
The need for haste dragged us out of our beds at 5 a.m. on October 1st to breakfast early, climb aboard the APC's and be off up the road, clattering and clanking through Binh Ba while the early morning mist was still clinging to the tops of the rubber trees. The armoured command vehicle was carefully piloted through the narrow gates of the Duc Thanh compound, a feat which some had declared impossible, while the Vietnamese soldiers and their families who lived in the compound completed their morning washing and breakfasts.
The compound had been chosen as the headquarters site partly because of the invitation of Captain Be, the District Chief, and partly because of the security offered by the compound solved the continually vexing question of how to protect the headquarters without taking a company or the support platoons away from forward operations. It certainly proved to be an entertaining choice. The compound was a square with sides approximately two hundred yards. Hard up against an outer ramp of earth and timber which was crowned by barbed wire, were a continuous row of tin roof shanties some five feet high, with front walls made from ammunition boxes and cylindrical shell containers. Inside the compound was a inner square of defenses which was also ringed by shanties on its outer side so that all the families of the soldiers, some five hundred persons in all, were grouped in medieval fashion in the outer bailey.
The keep was the district headquarters building with its associated bunkers built below ground level. The compound had once been a French fort and the old French style flagpole still stood on top of the low circular platform of the roof of a disused cylindrical concrete bunker in the centre of the inner bailey. A tall Teutonic looking tower stood nearby, some forty feet high, with widely splayed legs of wood. Its square top was capped by a roof which sloped out widely over each side so that there was only a narrow slit some few inches high for the observers in the tower to scan the surrounding area. The wide eaves of the roof protected the men in the tower from view by throwing them into a deep shadow and shielded them from missiles like a visor in the age of chivalry - the age from which the tower had been transplanted.
The compound was well protected by belts of barbed wire and minefields. Beyond these obstacles was a broad, flat area of open ground over which any attackers had to cross. This area was dotted with pre-arranged artillery target points. Route 2 ran close by the western edge of the compound. Two stone blockhouses guarded the adjacent stretch of road from either end of the western wall. The high rectangular gateway could be closed by two large iron gates, and low watch towers stood at the four corners of both of the outer and inner squares.
The families of the soldiers had come far and wide throughout Phuoc Tuy to follow their husbands and fathers. Small children ran naked or clad only in shirts throughout the compound, playing in the black dirt and crowding around any parade or other activity of the defenders to stare inquisitively and make their chattering comments to each other. The women sat in their doorways, washing pots or children, cooking, smoking, chewing betel nut, conversing or just squatting on their haunches, staring impassively into space. Some of the men patrolled by day, other did training, while the rest sat
about and looked over the fortifications or just slept, from midday until 4 p.m. everyone slept, unless a small operation was being mounted. When the cool of the evening came the men would play hectic, skilful games of basketball and volleyball before assembling for the evening muster parade, roll call and allocation of duties for the night, for the compound really came alive defensively only at night. At dusk the outer gates were shut, locking the sentries in each of the block houses on the road out of the compound to face the fates of the night unaided and without means of escape. men stood in each of the towers around the inner and outer walls. Three men climbed into the high tower to remain there until dawn, while below ground the switchboard which connected the telephones from each sentry post was manned all night.
It is very easy to point out the faults of this ancient approach to modern mobile guerilla warfare. The company defending Duc Thanh was tied to a static role, its location always known to the Viet Cong, as was the direction to which to attack the compound. The soldiers were severely limited to the type of operations which they could mount on foot from the compound and their situation was beset by many problems caused by the boredom and dullness imposed on the soldiers by this mode of operation. Nonetheless, this post had survived two years of isolation ten miles deep into territory which had been controlled by an immensely stronger enemy. The Government troops had been contained within a tiny area, around which they patrolled up to a distance of a mile away. They were kept away from all significant centres of population by the strength of the Vet Cong, yet the post had remained in Government hands awaiting the restoration of Government authority and ready to act as a spring board to enable the process to commence.
While we were erecting tents and radio aerials in the compound, D Company were moving forward up Route 2, mounted on the APC's to begin to sweep out to the north-east of the compound. Once the company had reached its starting point and was on the ground, a balanced maneuver was began. The company on foot searched the thick areas of bush and wood while the APC's moving with anti-tank platoon on board in a cavalry role, swept rapidly over wide open areas to the flank of D Company. The control problems posed by the simultaneous operation of the forces which moved at different speeds were formidable, for they tended to separate and create areas to which the Viet Cong could escape. This made the rapid progress of the combined force along its planned path very absorbing to follow the battalion in the command post.
One of our methods of control was the helicopter. I was sent aloft for a few hours to observe our own movement and to look for any enemy attempting to move out of the area,. Because D Company had moved into some thick country where I was of no assistance to them, we flew out to the east to see if any enemy could be seen in the country through which they oftened passed. We climbed to nearly three thousand feet from which height we could see the entire topography of Phuoc Tuy. Tiny clouds of mist were clinging to the tops of the rubber trees, caught between the joins of the individual tree tops in parallel rows. The greens beneath us looked fresh and soft in the early morning light which was filtering through a layer of cloud in the eastern sky in long slanting rays. We could see far into the distance - much farther than I had ever been able to see before. The central highlands of Vietnam rose and fell in a succession of sharp peaks across the horizon. The lesser peaks which crowned the foothills tumbled down in an uneven cascade to the plains of Long Khanh, north of Phuoc Tuy. The conical bulk of the May Tao mountain was silhouetted in the east against white mist from the sea. The horizon to the north and west were broken by the high hills which crossed Long Khanh from east to west, by the low hills of the Hat Dich area at the junction of Phuoc Tuy, Long Khanh and Bien Hoa provinces, and by the Dinh hill in the western Phuoc Tuy. The broad, flat tongue of the Vung Tau peninsula, terminated by the isolated heights of the Ganh Rai Mountains, seemed very truncated when viewed along its axis. Around the southern shore of Phuoc Tuy ran a broad yellow band of sand, edged with the white line of breaking waves.
Urgent reality interrupted my fascination with this scene as the radio earphones reminded me that a war was going on at ground level. Small patches of red earth, recently dug out, could be seen beneath the dark green tree tops. In some places the gaps in the foliage were wide enough to show the unmistakable marks of ox cart tracks. Excitement grew as we saw that these tracks had been used recently and heavily. The long shadows cast by the trees in the early morning hindered us a great deal until we saw a peculiarly square shadow cast on part of the track which ran east and west and which had no vegetation to obscure it from the air. A closer look showed that it was an ox cart halted on the track. Its top was camouflaged and the oxen had been hidden to prevent their movement from betraying the presence of the cart.
The pilot, Lieutenant Barron, discussed with me the possibility of directing artillery fire onto the cart. The guns at Duc Thanh were in range so we offered them the target. The white phosphorous smoke generating shells which were used for ranging were quickly corrected to within fifty yards of the cart and high explosive fire for effect began. Five rounds from each gun in the battery came down in a close pattern of bursts around the cart, sufficient to cause considerable damage both to the cart and its contents. We then followed the track on which the cart was towards the east, recording the signs of recent use for our own operations and for artillery harassing fire programmes.
Max Carroll was next to use the helicopter. He did several passes over the area to the north of Duc Thanh until he saw a man in black pajamas running away from our troops a full pelt. He ran into a hut and vanished. Max indicated the house to D Company over the radio and by hovering over it, almost touching its roof. Troops entered the house and searched it to find nothing. The fugitive must have had some extremely concealed exit route which had not been visible from the air.
Shortly afterwards the APC's, who were sweeping around towards Route 2 from the east, reported that they were being spied upon by three Viet Cong, one of whom had binoculars. The Viet Cong were on a low ridgeline, on the western side of the road. The APC's sped forward until they were halted by a swamp and could proceed no further. The Viet Cong were some few hundred yards away by this time and it was pointless for the anti-tank platoon to dismount and flounder through the mud after them, particularly since the Viet Cong were out of sight on the far side of the ridge. However, two of our 81 mm mortars were mounted in APC's and they brought down almost instantaneous fire over open sights on the likely Viet Cong line of escape.
D Company's sweep went on during the afternoon, covering some two miles, in which they questioned a number of peasants, examined identity cards and searched huts. All appeared to be quite until five minutes to four a report of a contact with an enemy sniper galvanized all that were in earshot of the battalion headquarters command radio. Seconds later another message came through from Major Paul Greenhalgh to say that one of his men had been hit, just as Max Carroll had been taking the usual precaution of ordering the Dust Off helicopter at Task Force Headquarters to stand by. The details which Paul gave were: one litter case priority urgent, landing zone within two hundred yards. The soldier's name was passed in a simple code in order to deny his rank and name to the Viet Cong who might have been listening to our transmissions. He was Private Warburton, a forward scout of Dennis Rainer's platoon. This news changed the atmosphere and conversation ceased. as everyone waited anxiously for more details from D Company and for the familiar rapid thudding of the helicopter.
Private Warburton had been shot by a sniper as he stepped out of some thick bush and stood searching an open patch. The sniper had concealed himself on the other side of the clearing was quite invisible to Warburton. He fired two shots, one hitting Warburton low in the chest, the other nicking his arm. Immediately the machine gun group of Warburton's section came forward and sprayed the area with rapid fire. They were probably just a few seconds too late. No traces of blood were found when the area was searched, so presumably the sniper had fled as soon as he had fired. This contact emphasized the fact that we were up against a skilled enemy, for that degree of marksmanship indicated a man with better training than a local guerilla.
As soon as the news of Warburton's wounding had been passed to battalion headquarters, Colonel Warr sent Tony White off to D Company in the light reconnaissance helicopter which we had been using all day. Ten minutes later the tension was relieved as the Dust Off helicopter whirred over us a ninety miles an hour and dropped into D Company's area. Warburton's wounds were too bad to be flown back to hospital on the outside litter frame of the smaller helicopter, so Tony had decided to wait for the larger Iroquois. Tony boarded the Dust Off helicopter as soon as Warburton's stretcher had been placed aboard. Unfortunately the wound was extremely severe and Warburton died while in the air en route for 36th Evacuation hospital in Vung Tau.
It was now late in the afternoon and D Company began to pull back to a better defensive position to harbour for the night. Inside the compound the hectic chatter of the soldiers' families subsided. The men mustered for their evening parade and those on duty went off to their posts while darkness descended swiftly. The moon was near full when it rose shortly afterwards, making the sky a light background which silhouetted the small sentry towers overlooking the community sleeping inside the security of the barbed wire, the ditch and the rampart. The coming of night and the subsidence of domestic activity concentrated the consciousness of all those remaining awake towards defence, as sentries peered into the gloom to detect any movement out of the trees into the open space which surrounded the compound. The seeming unreality of the evening and the contradictions of the entire war were epitomized by the tinkling oriental music which wafted through the air from a transistor radio belonging to one of the sentries.
On the following morning, October 2nd, C Company went forward to search the village of Ngai Giao which spread out along Route 2 in several clusters over a mile and a half of the road. This search was a difficult one to conduct for the straggling nature of Ngai Giao made it impossible for a single battalion to cordon the village. Fortunately the mobility of the APC's and the presence of a helicopter were some compensation with their speed for pursuing any fugitives observed making for the jungle. The search made good progress and uncovered ample evidence of Viet Cong activity. A large amount of meat was discovered in one house occupied by a women who said her husband had been absent for a long time. The woman admitted that the meat was to be collected at night by the Viet Cong. She added that she did not like the Viet Cong but she had to do what they commanded while her husband was under their control. The meat was taken to Captain Be who gave it to the poor Montagnards who lived along the entrance road to Binh Gia in the hamlet of La Van and who could be trusted not to give the meat to the Viet Cong. The major haul of the operation was rice. A large cache of six tons were discovered together with some smaller amounts to make up approximately 1,500 lbs. This was enough rice to feed a complete Viet Cong main force regiment for one week, so its capture robbed the Viet Cong of another useful staging supply to sustain them in moves between eastern and western Phuoc Tuy.
Operation Crowsnest lasted only one further day because of the proximity of an operation to secure Route 15. C Company continued to search Ngai Giao in the morning and they swept around to a hamlet on the north-west of the village, three miles from Duc Thanh. Five men of military age were discovered who did not have identity cards. One of these men was a Chinese who owned a rice shop. He had a large amount of Cambodian money in his possession and kept many pigeons. These men were all suspects and were taken to Captain Be to explain how they came to have no identity cards. They were later released by Colonel Dat after providing some very detailed information about Viet Cong organizations and activities in Ngai Giao.
Amongst other activities, such as kidnapping people from Binh Gia, The Viet Cong in Ngai Giao had been buying food from the local people at very differing prices. For some commodities such as meat of which relatively small amounts were required, levies were made on the villagers who would receive either a low rate of payment or none at all. However, in the case of rice, fish and salt, the basic ingredients of the Viet Cong diet, The Viet Cong paid the villagers at nearly twice the ruling market prices in order to stimulate the villagers to collect rice from far and wide. The Viet Cong had always plenty of money and paid for the rice in brand new two hundred and five hundred piastre notes. However, penetration of Ngai Giao by this operation had enabled Captain Be to establish control over the amount of rice which could be sold by the shops at any one time and the amount that any individual could have in his house. Both these quantities covered only a few days requirements for a single family so obstruction was given to the Viet Cong rice collection programme at Ngai Giao.
Operation Crowsnest was the first thrust by allied or Government troops into this area for several years. Because it was merely a temporary thrust it compelled the main force Viet Cong who had been using the village to vacate the area for a few days only. However we had our hands full with Binh Ba and we did not intend to allow the Viet Cong back into that village by over-extending ourselves. It was sufficient that the people of Ngai Giao had seen that we had the power to operate through their locality and that the Viet Cong could do little about the security of their supplies in an area which there had never before been any doubt of control by the Viet Cong. These factors are not decisive in a military struggle, but they may be in a political one.
Captain Robert O'Neill
Intelligence Officer
5 RAR