In January, our final batch of National Service reinforcements arrived and training for war commenced in earnest. National Servicemen now comprised approximately 50% of the Battalion's strength and many eyes were upon us to see how we would perform.

The Rifle Companies were now up to strength with Private Soldiers and most junior NCO positions had either been filled or soon would be. Filling the many vacancies at Sergeant and Warrant Officer level was not so easy. Both John Warr and Stan Maizey spent much time lobbying the various superior HQ and the Central Army Records Office to fill our vacancies with the best men available.

In this they were largely successful and our original small group of ex 1RAR Warrant Officers and SNCOs were joined by a growing band of experienced men. Many of the Corporals from E Company 1RAR were promoted to Sergeant including Stretch Witheridge and Tassy Wass and I was especially pleased when Rowdy Hindmarsh, Skinny Calvert and Derek Collins who had been my three Section Commanders in 19 Platoon 1RAR, also became Sergeants.

We could plan on having no more than three months to prepare for war and everyone set to work with an enthusiasm that in the circumstances was surprising. There was practically no political opposition to the involvement of America and its allies in South Vietnam at the time; that was to evolve much later although we did step up the security of Gallipoli Barracks from a position where the camp was totally open to anyone who might have wished to visit us! We certainly didn't have armed sentries at the gate in those days.

The Rifle Companies worked long hours and frequently spent from dawn until well after darkness practising and improving their skills with rifles and machine guns on the nearby ranges. At that time riflemen were equipped with an Australian made 7.62mm Self Loading Rifle – a version of the original Belgian Fabrique Nationale design and practically identical to the British SLR. Each platoon had three American made 7.62 belt fed M60 light machine guns. Platoon Commanders, Section Commanders, Radio Operators and other such "support" personnel were issued with a 9mm Owen sub machine gun. This was an Australian designed and manufactured weapon that was very reliable. It was being replaced with another 9mm sub machine gun design but both were withdrawn during our tour in South Vietnam because they had insufficient "stopping power". A hit with a 9mm round did not guarantee the target would go down – the round might be stopped by a heavy webbing belt or pouch and the target would remain "active" – and potentially lethal!

We took 106mm Recoilless Rifles and 66mm Carl Gustav anti tank launchers to Vietnam but apart from taking a very long "pot-shot" from the top of Nui Dat hill at a suspected Elephant (supposedly used by the VC as cargo carriers), neither weapons were used and remained in storage. In fact the Swedish Government refused to supply Carl Gustav projectiles as it opposed the war in Vietnam.

We were allocated ample quantities of small arms and 81 mm mortar ammunition with which to reach a high state of readiness. Trevor Sheehan had recently completed a course as an 81mm Mortar Platoon Commander and he soon brought his mortar crews and their Sergeant Mortar Fire Controllers who would each accompany a Rifle Company Commander on operations, to a high state of training. Bob Gunning was the Mortar Platoon 2I/C who would command the actual mortar line. As Platoon Commander, Trevor would be part of the Battalion HQ Fire Support Coordination Centre (FSCC) which included the Officer Commanding the Field Artillery Battery that would always be in Direct Support of the Battalion once operationally deployed.

The Rifle Companies also carried out their own training exercises in the Gospers Mountains. There was much work to do at Battalion HQ and the administrative staff also worked very long hours. Battalion HQ deployed on a number of shake down (or was it up?) exercises in the local Holsworthy training area. None of us had much experience of how an infantry Battalion HQ should operate in the field and through trial and error (and initially without the complication of Rifle Companies to command) we worked out who from the HQ staff was actually needed in the field and who could support the Battalion's activities better from a base location. We developed answers to such questions as how does the HQ actually move on foot through thick country? What should the make up of the various parties be? Who was best placed to actually command the movement, to lay out the defences when we stopped? What was the role of the RSM? Who would provide sentries at night, who would organise the support of massed helicopters that were the usual method of getting around in South Vietnam, who would organise offensive air support, where would the FSCC party be? Together with radio operators and orderlies, the FSCC party alone numbered seven people. How would re-supply for the Rifle Companies be arranged ― and who would be responsible? What sort of defensive position should we dig as a matter of routine every time we stopped for more than a short break? How could we operate the command post by night without showing any lights? Who should be in the command post? What sort of radio aerials did we need to put up whenever we stopped both for communicating with the Rifle Companies and the rear link to Task Force HQ?

We had to develop our standard operating procedures (the military's beloved "SOPs") pretty well from scratch although after John Warr returned in January 1966 from a short visit to 1RAR in South Vietnam, the copy of their SOPs which he brought with him was very helpful indeed.

Each Rifle Company spent three weeks at the Canungra Jungle Training Centre and I was able to get away and visit one of them for a few days. I enjoyed the break and from what I saw, the Diggers seemed to be enjoying the experience which for many of them was the first time they had seen tropical rain forest.

We arranged basic Vietnamese language courses for selected members of Rifle Companies and Bob O'Neil delivered lectures on Vietnam and the reasons for Australia's involvement in the war to all members of the Battalion. As a former Rhodes Scholar, Bob was expected to know these details!

In recent years there have been reports of National Servicemen being asked if they did or did not wish to serve in Vietnam. I don't recall any formal procedure, but Ralph Thompson remembers me instructing him to address all National Servicemen on the Battalion Parade ground and warning them of operational service. According to Ralph, they were more interested in getting away to the boozer than what they all knew was inevitable anyway! I believe that had anyone approached his Company Commander and stated that he did not wish to accompany the Battalion, I'm sure he would have been left behind on some pretext or other. I believe to this day that there was no dissent among the ranks of 5RAR to the forthcoming deployment. It was after all, the greatest adventure in which any of us had participated.

A final series of exercises was arranged in March in which the whole Battalion participated as a complete unit for the first time. We flew by RAAF De Havilland Caribou aircraft from the airstrip at Holsworthy to a rough airstrip in the Gospers Mountain training area (near Rylstone NSW). Although we were training for jungle warfare, the final exercise was almost called off because of heavy snowfall and plunging temperatures in the final 48 hours!

Brigadier Vincent; commander of the 1st Task Force supervised the final exercise. At the conclusion of a week of hard slogging over the very difficult and latterly snowy terrain of Gospers Mountains, he pronounced that we were good enough to deploy to the tropical jungles of South Vietnam!

My personal view is that in the mid 1960s, the Australian Regular Army was ill prepared to undertake a major overseas military commitment and cite the varied backgrounds of the officers, the frequency of postings into and out of the Battalion in 1965 together with the serious shortage of senior NCOs as evidence of that ill preparedness. A huge effort got under way to correct the deficiencies in numbers and in training, but by the standards which evolved and certainly by those of today, we were only just up to the mark in April 1966 and the experience of war soon revealed some shortcomings in both officers and NCOs; including one Company Commander being dismissed in July and another being posted to a staff appointment on medical grounds in August.

General Tom Daly was General Officer Commanding Eastern Command and he was a frequent visitor as it was his HQ that was responsible for our preparation. In December 1997, John Warr told me that General Tom's final words of advice to him were as follows:

"If you have a choice of accomplishing something in 12 hours but with a high risk of casualties or of doing the same thing in 24 hours but with less risk, do it at less risk – your men's lives are more important."

Deployment for most of us was to be by QANTAS civil airliner, but one Rifle Company had to sail to the South China Sea aboard the converted aircraft carrier HMAS Sydney together with all the vehicles and heavy equipment for the remainder of the 1st Task Force that was to follow. Being an enthusiastic gambler by nature, Stan Maizey held a draw to decide which Rifle Company should enjoy a nine day tropical cruise and Paul Greenhalgh of D Company drew the black spot from Stan's upturned cap. Having already told his Company that they would deploy by air, Paul was aghast. He approached John Warr and Noel Granter was told that C Company would sail instead.